The turning points of EU cohesion policy, Working Paper Report to Barca Report by Manzella, GP & Mendez, Carlos
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Manzella, GP and Mendez, Carlos (2009) The turning points of EU cohesion policy, Working Paper
Report to Barca Report. [Report]
Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research output of the University of Strathclyde.
Copyright c© and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors
and/or other copyright owners. You may not engage in further distribution of the material for any
profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://
strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the content of this paper for research or study, educational, or
not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge.
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to Strathprints administrator:
mailto:strathprints@strath.ac.uk
http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/
 The turning points of  
EU Cohesion policy1 
Report Working Paper of 
Gian Paolo Manzella 
European Investment Bank 
Luxembourg 
Carlos Mendez 
European Policies Research Centre 
University of Strathclyde 
United Kingdom 
January 2009 
                                                 
1  This working paper has been written in the context of the report "An Agenda for a reformed Cohesion 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................... 3 
THE EVOLUTION OF EU COHESION POLICY IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE ........................................................................................................... 5 
Regional policy in the Treaty of Rome ....................................................................... 5 
Towards the creation of a Community regional policy............................................... 6 
The arrival of the ERDF.............................................................................................. 8 
The 1979 and 1984 reforms: the gradual Europeanisation of Community 
regional policy. ................................................................................................ 11 
The 1988 reform: a new era for Cohesion policy...................................................... 13 
The 1993 and 1999 reforms: fine-tuning, decentralisation and effectiveness........... 15 
The 2007-2013 reform: the strategic turn.................................................................. 18 
ON THE SCALE, SCOPE AND DIRECTION OF CHANGE......................................... 20 




EU Cohesion (or regional) policy has not had an easy life. Since its inception, the 
criticism it has been subjected to has been a constant in the history of the European 
Union. When the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was first created in the 
mid-1970’s, the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt mocked that there was nothing 
much of Community interest in the policy and that it “lay firmly in the hands of national 
governments.”2 Academic commentators were equally dismissive during this foundation 
period, criticising the fund’s limited scope and scale, trivial impact, and Member State-
dependent organisation and operation.3  
The current Cohesion policy has not been immune from this long-standing streak of 
criticism. In many ways, Cohesion policy remains “under threat”,4 as a range of 
academics, analysts, practitioners and European governments continue to question the 
policy’s rationale, organisation and effectiveness. For instance, amongst the key 
criticisms that arose in the run-up to the most recent reform (2005/6), are the following: 
that it has developed into a ‘catch-all’ policy without a clear mission; that it is 
insufficiently focused on growth; that is has inadequate policy instruments; and that it is 
excessively complex and bureaucratic to administer.5 Despite the introduction of several 
important changes for the 2007-2013 period, similar objections have begun to surface in 
the context of the current debate on the future of Cohesion policy post-2013.6  
One of the biggest problems for defenders of Cohesion policy is the difficulty in 
providing a credible economic case for the policy, based on conclusive evidence of 
effective results. After more than thirty years of intervention, the contribution of 
Cohesion policy to economic development and growth remains contested and uncertain.7 
A wide range of results are reported in a vast literature on the subject, ranging, at best, 
                                                 
2  See Bulmer S., and Paterson W., (1987), The Federal Republic of Germany and the European 
Community, London, Allen and Unwin, p. 202. 
3  Wallace H., (1977), The establishment of the Regional Development Fund: Common Policy or Pork 
Barrel? in Wallace H, Wallace W and Webb C (eds.), Policy-making in the European Community, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 137-63; Martins R.M., and Mawson J., (1982), The 
Programming of Regional Development in the EC: Supranational or International Decision-making?, 
in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 229-244; Meny Y., (1982), Should the 
Community Regional Policy be scrapped?, in Common Market Law Review, Vol. 19, No.3, pp. 373-
88; Armstrong H. W., The reform of the European Community Regional Policy, in Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol.23, No.4, pp 319-343; De Witte B., (1986), The reform of the European 
Regional Fund, in Common Market Law Review, pp. 419-440.  
4  Hooghe L., (1988), EU Cohesion policy and competing models of EU capitalism, in Journal of 
Common Market studies, Vol.36, No.4, pp. 457-77. 
5  See, for instance, the “Sapir Report”: Sapir A., Aghion P., Bertola G., Helwigg, M., Pisany-Ferry J., 
Rosati D., Viñals J., and Wallace H., (2004) An Agenda for a Growing Europe, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. For similar criticisms see: Tarschys D., (2003) Reinventing cohesion: the future of 
European Structural Policy, in SIEPS, Stockholm. Among national governments’ contributions to the 
debate, the UK’s A modern regional policy for the United Kingdom of March 2003 has been the most 
advanced in calling for a radical revision.  
6  See the responses to the Commission’s consultation on the future of Cohesion policy on the DG Regio 
website. A review is available in Bachtler J., Mendez C., and Wishlade F., (2009), Ideas for Budget 
and Policy Reform: Reviewing the Debate on Cohesion Policy 2014+, European Policy Research 
Papers, No. 67, European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.   
7  Bachtler J., and Gorzelak G., (2007), Reforming EU Cohesion Policy, in Policy Studies, Vol. 28:4, 
p309. 
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from positive correlations between Structural Funds intervention and growth to, at worst, 
negative impacts.8  
This uncertainty has often led advocates of the policy to emphasise the beneficial impacts 
associated with the qualitative “added value” generated by Cohesion policy’s 
implementation model.9 Multi-annual planning requirements are said to have encouraged 
the adoption of more long-term and strategic approaches to economic development by 
different tiers of government. A range of monitoring, evaluation and control conditions 
are considered to have contributed to the improvement of public administration processes 
and cultures. The requirement to involve different types of partners in the design and 
implementation of programmes, it is argued, has encouraged more inclusive policy-
making and delivery, and has contributed to broader decentralisation trends across 
Europe. From a financial perspective, it is reported that additional resources for 
economic development have been leveraged through the additionally principle and 
match-funding requirements. More generally, it is argued that Cohesion policy has had 
an effect in steering national preferences towards European objectives, through an 
ongoing process of europeanisation of national institutions and the diffusion of European 
values. Again, however, critics question the contribution of the Structural Funds to these 
various elements, pointing to the variability of impacts across time and space, not to 
mention the possibility of attaining similar objectives through less expensive and 
bureaucratic means.  
In more recent discussions on the future of Cohesion policy, however, both critics and 
supporters have tended to agree on the need for a “modernisation” of the policy, in 
recognition of existing weakness in the current approach and of the emerging challenges 
faced by the European economy, society and broader integration process. In this context 
of reform, this paper will take a step back in time to examine the origins and evolution of 
Cohesion policy, with a view to shedding some light on its core dynamics and revealing 
some of the lessons of history. In doing so, the main objectives of this paper are to 
identify the main historical turning points in Cohesion policy, the trends and nature of 
changes witnessed, and the key underlying factors facilitating or obstructing policy 
reform over time.  
                                                 
8  For a positive view, see: Beugelsdijk M. and Eijffinger S.. (2005), The effectiveness of Structural 
policy in the European Union: an empirical analysis for the EU15 in 1995-2001, in Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 37-51; Ezcurra R. and Rapu N., (2006), Regional 
disparities and national development revisited: the case of Western Europe, in European Urban and 
Regional Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 355-369; Lopez-Rodriguez J. and Faiña A.,(2006), Objective 1 
regions versus non-Objective 1 regions: what does the Theil Index tell us?, in Applied Economics 
Letters, Vol. 13, pp. 815-820. For a more critical view see: Boldrin M. and Canova F., (2001), 
Inequality and Convergence in Europe’s regions: reconsidering European regional policies, in 
Economic Policy, Vol. 32, pp. 207-245; Miderlfart K, and Overman H, (2002), Delocation and 
European integration: is structural spending justified?, in Economic Policy, Vol. 17, No. 35, pp. 321-
259; Martin P., (1999), Are European regional policies delivering?, in EIB Papers , Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 
10-23. 
9  For a review, see: Bachtler J. and Taylor S., (2003), The added value of the Structural Funds, in IQ-
Net Special Paper, European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde; see also: Mairate A. 
(2006), The ‘‘added value’’ of European Union Cohesion policy, in Regional Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, 
pp. 167-177.  
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THE EVOLUTION OF EU COHESION POLICY IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE  
Regional policy in the Treaty of Rome 
Looking back to the origins of the EC (European Community, later European Union), 
regional policy appears to be the great absentee. Despite the recognition of the existence 
of a “regional issue” in all European countries at the Messina convention of 1955 and the 
presence of a founding country such as Italy (which had in the Mezzogiorno the 
territorial problem par excellence in post-war Europe) attention to regional policy in the 
Treaty of Rome of 1957 was minimal. In the preamble, the founding signatories did 
declare their aim of “reducing the differences existing between the various regions and 
the backwardness of the less favoured regions”. Article 2 also specified that the 
Community was tasked with promoting a “harmonious development of economic 
activities” and “a continuous and balanced expansion”. However, in the main body of 
Treaty, the regional issue was largely addressed indirectly, namely, through a series of 
provisions concerning specific sectoral policies such as agriculture, transport and state 
aid. The only financial instrument created to directly promote regional development was 
the European Investment Bank, which had among its tasks that of granting loans “which 
facilitate the financing of projects for developing less developed regions”. 
There are three main reasons for this rather vague and cautious approach to regional 
policy when the European Community was founded.  
The first relates to the policy context of the time. While there were some important 
experiences in the field – the established British and North-American practices, as well 
as the emerging policy initiatives in France and Italy from the early 1950s – regional 
policy was still largely a nascent policy area. Moreover, the policy was inherently 
politically-sensitive as it touched on issues associated with the relationship between 
public power and enterprise and with the territorial organisation of the state. It is, 
therefore, understandable that there was reticence to grant responsibilities in this field to 
a newly established European organisation.  
It is significant, in this respect, that still in 1969 the Commission argued that: 
“even more than other branches of economic policy, regional policy is clearly the 
concern of the public authorities in the member states. The measures it involves 
fall directly under the political, cultural, administrative, sociological and 
budgetary organisation of the States. Regional policy forms an integral part of 
the system of internal balances on what the State is based.10 
A second factor was the prevailing economic orthodoxy, which was generally not 
supportive of the creation of a comprehensive regional policy at Community level. 
Instead, the emphasis was on the need for coordination of national regional policies.11 
Moreover, there was a general and, arguably, over-optimistic feeling among the EC 
                                                 
10  Commission of the European Communities (1969) A Regional Policy for the Community, COM (69) 
950, 15th of October 1969, Brussels, p. 13. 
11  See Chapter 9 of Balassa B., (1961), The Theory of Economic Integration, R.D. Irwin,  
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founders that integration would contribute to reducing regional disparities through the 
promotion of inter-regional trade.12  
Finally, it should not be overlooked that the World Bank was founded in this period and 
that, more generally, the early 1950s represented a period of great expectation about the 
capacity of Public Investment Banks to activate dynamics of growth in underdeveloped 
contexts. In the economics literature of the time, lack of adequate financial capital was 
seen as one of the main obstacles to the generation of normal dynamics of infrastructure 
and industrial investment and, therefore, development. The choice to entrust the 
European Investment Bank with a role in redressing imbalances in Europe thus had some 
foundation in the economic thinking of the period.13 
The outcome of these various elements was that the regional issue was dealt with through 
a series of provisions which bore little, if any, resemblance to what could be termed a 
coherent supranational approach to regional policy. In addition to the episodic references 
to the theme in the various articles of the Treaty, the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
was designed as an intergovernmental body, owned and governed by the Member States. 
Its statute was clear in assigning to the Member States the final say concerning the 
admissibility of projects for loans, and the Bank had only functional links with the 
European Commission. In a similar vein, the exemptions regarding state aids rules for 
regional development under Competition policy signalled the intention of Member States 
to retain their autonomy in supporting their underdeveloped areas.  
Regional policy was, therefore, not unknown at the beginning of the EC. It was simply 
decided not to assign a direct, interventionist role to the European Commission, 
favouring instead an organisation (the EIB) controlled by national governments.  
Towards the creation of a Community regional policy 
The inadequacy of the decisions made in the Treaty regarding regional policy soon 
became evident. In the absence of a firm legal basis, and without specific instructions, 
the initiative for the establishment of a Community regional policy lay with the 
Commission. Its first move was to organise a “Conference on Regional Economies” in 
December 1961, attended by national administrators with responsibilities in the area and 
experts in the field. The main outcome was to kick-start a process of reflection on the 
subject, including the setting up of working groups comparing different experiences and 
methods, the commissioning of territorial studies, and the promotion of exchanges of 
experience among national governments. At an institutional level, the output of this work 
was officially recognised in 1964 in the Community’s First Medium-Term Economic 
Policy Programme, which provided the basis for the first Commission Communication 
(or Memorandum) on Regional policy in 1965.14 The document argued for the creation of 
a comprehensive regional policy, entailing the coordination of national initiatives on the 
basis of regional development programmes grounded on a common methodology and 
formulated through a participative approach (including sub-national and social partners). 
                                                 
12  Vanhove L., and Klassen L.H., (1987), Regional Policy: a European Approach, Avebury: Aldershot, 
p. 258. 
13  See Rostow W., (1960), The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
14  Commission of the European Communities (1965) First Communication of the European Commission 
on Regional Policy in the European Community, SEC (65) 1170 def., Brussels 
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Throughout this period, the Commission also sought to increase direct contact with local 
and regional administrations through a series of meetings and the diffusion of 
information.  
Notwithstanding these efforts and a series of resolutions by the European Parliament,15 
pressure for the institutionalisation of an EC regional policy arrived only at a later stage - 
between the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. Following the 
administrative reorganisation of the Commission, the creation in 1968 of a specific 
Directorate General dedicated to Regional Policy was a clear sign of the increased 
interest in the matter. Two years later the Commission published a second Memorandum 
outlining its strategic vision for Community regional policy, including its first formal 
proposal for a Council decision.16 The policy rationale underpinning the proposal had a 
clear compensatory tone, stating that: 
“the basic objective of regional policy applied to the general problems of the 
common market is to help improve the harmony of regional structures in the 
Community, firstly in order to combat the mechanical effects which tend to develop 
owing to the mere fact of opening internal frontiers, and secondly in order to permit 
the implementation of common policies and to create maximum external economies 
for each of the regions” 
The main policy measures and instruments proposed included: the setting up of a 
Regional Development Fund granting interest rate subsidies and guarantees; the 
preparation of regional development plans by Member States and the Commission; the 
creation of a Regional Development Committee; and the setting up of a regional 
development company acting as an information centre for European public and private 
investors. While the proposal was not immediately followed up by the Council, the 
reasons for the sudden interest in regional policy merit further attention.  
In the first instance, there was a very specific economic situation. The economic crisis 
that had erupted in different European countries during this period raised social issues to 
the fore within EC debates and drew attention to the close link between declining 
industries and specific territorial areas. The ‘regional’ question was not anymore 
perceived to be an almost exclusively Southern Italian problem.  Demographic, labour 
market and sectoral challenges were increasingly recognised to be endemic across and 
within all Community regions to varying degrees.17 
A second, and arguably the most relevant, catalyst for the creation of a Community 
regional policy was the deepening of the debate on Economic and Monetary Union, 
which had been launched in the late 1960’s. Both the Barre document, which put the 
topic on the Community’s agenda, and, more explicitly, the Werner Plan, which defined 
the path towards monetary integration, emphasised the link between the process of 
                                                 
15  Resolution of European Parliament of 9th February 1959, in OJEC, 9 February 1959, p. 167 
(Resolution Van Campen); Resolution of European Parliament of 2nd June 1960, in OJEC, 2 June 
1960, p. 827 (Resolution Motte); Resolution of European Parliament of 22nd January 1964 in OJEC, 8 
February 1964, p. 114 (Resolution Birckelbach) 
16  Commission of the European Communities (1969) A Regional Policy for the Community, COM (69) 
950, 15th of October 1969, Brussels. 
17  Ibid. See annexes 1 (“Regional policy in the several member countries of the Community”) and, 
particularly, 2 (“An analysis of regional developments in the Community”). 
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monetary integration and the need for regional development intervention.18 More 
specifically, it was argued that compensation should be provided for the economic 
rigidities imposed on state budgets by the path of monetary unification. As it was stated 
in Chapter III of the Werner Report: 
“the realization of global economic equilibrium may be dangerously threatened by 
differences of structure. Cooperation between the partners in the Community in the 
matter of structural and regional policies will help to surmount these difficulties, 
just as it will make it possible to eliminate the distortions of competition. The 
solution of the big problems in this field will be facilitated by financial measures of 
compensation. In an economic and monetary union, structural and regional policies 
will not be exclusively a matter for national budgets.” 
Finally, and most importantly in political terms, this economic context was coupled with 
changes in Community membership and the related emergence of a new coalition of 
interests. At the beginning of the 1970’s, the first Community enlargement to include the 
UK and Ireland gained momentum, the latter economy facing significant development 
challenges and the former having a long-standing tradition of activist regional policy 
intervention. Moreover, from the UK’s perspective, a Community-level regional policy 
represented a potentially useful mechanism for drawing down EU funding to improve its 
net budgetary balance, given the relatively low projected returns under the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). It is on these premises that an “alliance” was struck between 
the UK, Ireland and Italy for the acceleration of a process which had been blocked since 
1969.19   
The arrival of the ERDF 
At the beginning of the 1970’s, Community regional policy was firmly on the EC 
agenda. Following the consideration given to regional problems in the context of 
agricultural policy reform, 20 the policy initiation stage was launched with the approval of 
a resolution at the Conference of Heads of State of Paris in 1972. On that occasion, the 
Member States declared their intention to “give top priority to correcting the structural 
and regional imbalances in the Community which could hinder the achievement of the 
Economic and Monetary Union.” In order to find “a Community solution of regional 
problems”, the Commission was invited to prepare a report analysing regional problems 
in the Community and to put forward a proposal for the creation of a Regional 
Development Fund.  
                                                 
18  See the Commission’s Memorandum on the coordination of economic policies and monetary 
cooperation (12 February 1969), in Bulletin of the European Communities, 1969, No Supplement 
3/69, pp. 3-14 and Report on the realisation by stages of economic and monetary union (8 October 
1970), in Bulletin of the European Communities, 1970, No Supplement 11/70, pp. 5-29. 
19  For the classic treatment, see: Wallace H., (1977) op.cit. For a more recent discussion, setting the 
establishment of European regional policy in the context of the wider attention to social themes of the 
Community policy of the period, see Varsori L. and Mechi A., (2007), At the origins of the Structural 
and Social policy in Van der Harst J., (ed.) (2007) Beyond the customs Union: the European 
Community’s quest for deepening, widening and completion, 1969-1975, Bruylant, Bruxelles/Paris, 
Nomos/Verlag, Baden-Baden. 
20  Commission of the European Communities (1971) Regional Policy actions in priority agricultural 
regions, COM (71) 500 def, Brussels. 
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Following these instructions, the Commission’s reform proposals were outlined in the 
“Report on Enlarged Europe” of May 1973, better known as the “Thomson Report” after 
the new British Commissioner for Regional Policy, George Thomson.21 It was 
immediately clear, from the perspective of the Commission at least, that the setting up of 
a Community regional policy was much more than a mere compensatory tool for 
integration spillovers. The report argued that reducing the differences existing between 
the various regions and the backwardness of the less-favoured regions was “a human and 
moral requirement of the first importance” because:22 
“No Community could maintain itself nor have a meaning for the people which 
belong to it so long as some have very different standards of living and have cause 
to doubt the common will of all to help each Member State to better the condition of 
its people. (…) Unless the Community’s economic resources are moved where 
human resources are, thus sustaining living local communities, there is bound to be 
disenchantment over the idea of European unity. The long history and diversity of 
the European people, the historical and cultural values which are the moral wealth 
of each region, make the maintenance of establishment in each region of the 
groundwork of an up-to-date economy a matter of capital importance.” 
In this sense, regional policy was perceived as a crucial instrument for the identity of a 
European model of society, and for the legitimacy and viability of the whole political 
process of integration. Yet the link to European Monetary Union (EMU) was also clear:  
“No Member States can be expected to support the economic and monetary 
disciplines of Economic and Monetary Union without Community solidarity 
involved in the effective use of such instruments: equally Member States must be 
prepared to accept the disciplines of Economic and Monetary Union as a condition 
of this Community support.” (p. 19) 
In terms of the economic and policy rationale, the purpose of a Community regional 
policy was defined as providing “areas suffering from regional imbalances the means to 
correct them and put themselves on a footing of more equal competitiveness.” The 
Thomson report stated that these regional imbalances comprised those that arose from 
the “absence of modern economic activity or the over-dependence (…) on agriculture or 
declining industrial activities” which could logically be found in specific geographical 
areas with a “preponderance of agriculture, in areas of industrial change and of 
structural under-employment.” Lastly, under the next section on the proposed guidelines 
for Community regional policy, it was stated that the Regional Development Fund 
“should be devoted entirely to the medium and long term development of the less 
developed and declining regions within the Member States, with the aim of bringing 
about self-sustaining growth.” 
                                                 
21   Commission of the European Communities (1973) Report on the Regional Problems of the Enlarged 
Community, COM (73) 550 def, Brussels 
22  Ibid. pp. 12-13. On a similar tone, Mr. Renato Ruggiero, at that date Head of the Regional Policy 
Directorate, argued that regional policy responded to “…a moral, human and political duty, more than 
just an economic one. It is clear that no Community can develop and endure its internal tensions if the 
population of which it is composed live in very different conditions and if they come to doubt the 
existence of a common will to improve them,” (author’s translation), Speech at the 5th European 
Management Symposium, 3 February 1975, Davos.    
10 
More detailed legislative proposals were subsequently submitted by the Commission to 
the Council in July 1973. The negotiations were lengthy and involved strong divisions 
among Member States and with the Commission. After agreement on the main financial 
elements at the summit of December 1974, the regulations were approved by the Council 
in March 1975.23 However, the final outcome could not be described as a comprehensive 
and common regional policy based on Community-wide criteria and priorities. Not only 
was the ERDF’s budget and distribution calculated on an intergovernmental basis, but 
Member States also retained direct control over every aspect of the Fund’s management 
and implementation. 
The total agreed budget for the Fund was 1.3 billion European Units of Account over a 
three year period (1975-8), representing around 5 percent of the Community budget. The 
distribution of resources to each Member State was determined on the basis of a system 
of national quotas, setting out the percentage share allocated to each Member State. The 
shares were largely worked out on the basis of inter-state bargaining, linked to net 
budgetary balances, and did not have a direct, explicit link to Community regional 
development needs. Similarly, geographical eligibility was to be determined on the basis 
of areas targeted under the Member States own regional policies, while applications for 
project financing would be channelled through (and essentially approved by) central 
governments, with no significant role for the Commission, let alone sub-national actors. 
Lastly, the planning system established by the regulation to allow the Commission to 
play a co-ordinating role among Member States’ regional policies was applied loosely 
and with limited effect; the Member States regional development plans were submitted 
late, lacked rigour and had limited impact on the projects selected.24 
Summing up, the Community’s regional policy and its decision-making dynamics were, 
at this stage, a “virtual paragon of intergovernmentalism”, with Member State 
governments dominating all aspects of the process.25 The institutionalisation of a truly 
European regional policy was, therefore, far from attained.  
                                                 
23  Regulation (EEC) No 724/75 of the Council of 18 March 1975 (OJ L 73, 21 March 1975). 
24   See Commission’s opinion of 23 May 1979, stressing the need for further refinement of the 
programmes if they were to constitute a precise framework for project assessment (OJ L 143, 12 June 
1979). 
25  McAleavey, P. (1992), The Politics of European Regional Development Policy: The European 
Commission’s RECHAR Initiative and the Concept of Additionality, in Strathclyde Papers on 
Government and Politics, No. 88, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, p. 3. 
11 
The 1979 and 1984 reforms: the gradual Europeanisation of Community regional 
policy. 
The inadequacies of the newly created Community regional policy were clear from the 
outset. In line with the conclusions of the controversial Tindemans report,26 there was 
widespread recognition of the need for a stronger Community regional policy which had 
increased resources and was: better suited to address the problems of European 
economies; more anchored in Community objectives and criteria; targeted at Community 
areas in greatest need; equipped with better co-ordinated instruments; and involved a 
stronger role for the Commission.27  
The need was all the more pressing in the light of the changed economic scenario. The 
oil crisis was taking its toll both on the European economy and on the financial 
conditions of many of the Member States. The persistence and deepening of regional 
imbalances threatened the proper functioning of the Common Market itself and new 
problems of adaptation and redevelopment added further complexity to the regional 
problems of the Community.28  
The opportunity for reform arose with the requirement for the Council to re-examine the 
regulation by January 1978.  The process was launched in June 1977 with the 
Commission’s submission of ‘Guidelines on Community Regional Policy’, alongside a 
more detailed legislative proposal.29 After lengthy negotiations, the amended regulations 
were approved in 1979.30  
From a budgetary perspective, a 50 percent annual increase in the ERDF was secured for 
the following year, although the total remained modest as a share of the overall budget 
(rising to 7 percent by 1983). More significant, however, were the qualitative changes to 
policy, most notably the introduction of a “non-quota section” to support Community 
actions arising from problems of common interest. With a share of 5 percent of the 
ERDF budget, the non-quota section allowed the Commission to support areas outside 
those designated by the Member States for domestic regional policy, and could take the 
form of financing for programmes instead of projects. Freed from a strict dependency on 
national rules, the Commission gained a more strategic role.  
                                                 
26  See Report on European Union, in Bulletin of the European Communities. 1976, No Supplement 1,  
pp. 11-35 (specifically, PART III-C). 
27  Wallace, H., (1977) op.cit;  Mawson J, Rui-Martins M and Gibney J.T., (1985), The Development of 
the European Community Regional Policy, in Jones B and Keating M (1985), Regions in the 
European Community, Clarendon Press, Oxford; G.J. Croxford, M., Wise, B.S., Chalkley., (1987) The 
Reform of the European Regional Development Fund: A preliminary assessment, in Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 26 No. 1, pp. 25-38. 
28  See Commission of the European Communities (1980), Fifth Annual Report – European Regional 
Development Fund (1979), COM (80) 460, 29 July 1980: “The gap between the richer and poorer 
regions widened in the seventies, mainly due to relatively high inflation rates in Ireland, Italy and the 
United Kingdom and the movements in the rates of exchange caused thereby” (at point 8). See also the 
brochure: Commission of the European Communities (1980), The Community and its Regions, 
European Documentation 1/80, Brussels. 
29  Commission of the European Communities (1977), Communication of the European Commission, 
COM 77 (195) def, Brussels.  
30  Council Regulation (EEC) No. 214/79 of 6 February 1979 amending Regulation (EEC) No. 724/75 
(OJ C 36,  9 February 1979) 
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Other changes included an enhanced role for regional development programmes, a 
widening in the scope of eligible infrastructure expenditure and some simplification of 
administrative and payments procedures. Lastly, from a policy development perspective, 
the Commission was given responsibility for preparing periodic reports on the social and 
economic situation of the regions of the Community, within which it could propose 
Community priorities and guidelines. 
A second revision of the Community’s regional policy in the mid-1980s introduced more 
substantial changes, notwithstanding the difficult context of the negotiations. The so-
called Eurosclerosis years of the early 1980s witnessed serious disputes between the 
Member States over the Community budget and a general stalling of integrative moves in 
the Community. Within this difficult scenario, in October 1981, the Commission tabled a 
first set of proposals for regional policy reforms. These had to be revised two years later 
(in November 1983) due to difficulties in reaching agreement.  
The regulations were ultimately agreed by the Council in June 1984 and introduced 
several important changes, primarily aimed at increasing the Community orientation of 
the policy.31  
Firstly, financial allocations to the ERDF were increased (although the share of the EU 
budget remained relatively stable), and were distributed to Member States on the basis of 
a new system of indicative ranges, instead of fixed quotas. Secondly, and related, the 
Commission’s discretionary power in the project selection process was enlarged. Thirdly, 
the scope of eligible expenditure was broadened, notably to include intangible 
investments. Lastly, the programme approach was reinforced by increasing the share of 
total funding to be channelled through programmes to 20 percent of the budget. This 
could take the form of Community Programmes (as was the case previously under the 
non-quota section) or National Programmes of Community Interest (initiated by the 
Member States to fund national regional aid schemes, infrastructure investment and 
operations to exploit endogenous potential for specific problem regions).  
Following the approval of the new ERDF regulation, a particularly important 
development was the agreement in 1985 on the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes 
(IMPs), designed to compensate Mediterranean regions for the increased competition 
arising from the accession of Spain and Portugal.32 Drawing on the experiences of 
“integrated operations” supported by the EC in Belfast and Naples at the beginning of the 
decade, the IMPs further extended the multi-annual programming, integrated and 
participative approach to Community regional policy which the Commission and other 
EU institutions had been calling for.  
Overall, the trend over the first half of the 1980s was clear. From a Member State 
controlled model, where the Commission’s role was effectively restricted to that of a 
treasurer signing blank cheques, policy moved to one involving a more cooperative 
relationship between both levels and became more grounded on Community objectives, 
priorities and experimentation, at least for part of the Cohesion policy budget. More 
importantly, the regulatory reforms, along with the agreement on the IMPs, were to 
                                                 
31  Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1787/84 of 19 June 1984 (OJ L 169, 28 June 1984). 
32  Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2088/85 of 23 July 1985 (OJ L 197, 27 July 1985). See, on the issue, 
De Witte B., (1990), The Integrated Mediterranean Programmes in the context of Community 
Regional Policy, EUI Law Working Paper, No 90/8, Florence.  
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provide lessons, if not a blueprint, for some of the principles which were to underpin the 
landmark reforms of 1988. 
The 1988 reform: a new era for Cohesion policy 
It is on this historical basis that the European Commission began to speak of a “new era” 
for the Community’s regional policy.33 Under the leadership of its new president Jacques 
Delors, the importance attached to the policy by the Commission was immediately clear, 
with one bold objective in mind: to transform it from an essentially intergovernmental 
budgetary transfer to that of a genuine regional development tool with the potential to 
provide effective solutions to the problems faced by the Community’s regions. In 
delivering the Commission’s Programme for 1985 to the European Parliament, Delors 
put the issue bluntly:34 
“Over the past 15 years regional disparities within the Community have widened. 
The underdeveloped regions of the periphery of the industrial heart of Europe have 
been joined by a number of old industrial regions whose traditional economic base 
is in structural decline. But the two are fundamentally different. The Community’s 
Structural Funds should – provided, of course, that they have sufficient resources – 
make it possible for the Community to support structural conversion and adjustment 
projects in regions in difficulty. The Commission aims to reverse the trend toward 
treating these funds as a mere redistribution mechanism.” 
The context and the times were favourable for change. In the words of Delors, “a new 
break in the clouds” had emerged, due to two inter-related factors. The first was the 
internal market programme, the lynchpin of Delors’ strategy for the re-launch of 
European integration following the “doldrums era.” The strengthening of cohesion was 
presented by the Commission as the sine qua non of this ambitious integration drive in 
recognition of the potentially damaging effects of the 1992 Programme on the more 
fragile economies of the Union. The message found intellectual support in two influential 
reports sponsored by the Commission, the Padoa-Schioppa and Cecchini Reports.35  
The second, closely related, facilitating factor was the Iberian enlargement. The 
accession of Spain and Portugal brought two much poorer members into the Community. 
Concerned about the competitive threat of the internal market to their economies, which 
already suffered from major regional (and national) development challenges, both 
countries had a strong case for demanding a revamped regional development policy, and 
were pivotal actors in altering the coalition of Community interests in favour of 
cohesion.  
                                                 
33  Commission of the European Communities (1985), Tenth Annual Report (ERDF), COM (85) 516, 
1985, p. 14. Similarly, a year later, the Eleventh Annual Report indicated 1985 as “a turning point for 
the ERDF”, COM (86) 545, 1986, p. iii. 
34  Programme of the Commission for 1985, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 4/85, at 
point 15. 
35  The first of these, for instance, highlighted the “serious risks of aggravated regional imbalance in the 
course of market liberalisation…” and the corresponding need for “…accompanying measures…to 
speed adjustment in structurally weak regions and countries.” Padoa-Schioppa T., Efficiency, Stability 
and Equity: A Strategy for the Evolution of the Economic System of the European Community, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1987. 
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Against this background, the process of reforming the Community’s regional policy 
progressed on the basis of three consecutive stages dealing with the legal basis for 
policy, its financing and the regulatory framework. The legal basis was addressed 
through the Single Act of 1985. The first major Treaty revision constitutionalised 
Cohesion policy by introducing the specific title of Economic and Social Cohesion. The 
policy objective was defined as promoting the “overall harmonious development” of the 
Community and “strengthening economic and social cohesion”, particularly by 
“reducing disparities between the various regions and the backwardness of the least-
favoured regions” (Article 130a).  The key policy instruments for delivering this 
objective were the three Structural Funds (the European Regional Development Fund, 
the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund-Guidance Section and the 
European Social Fund), although it was also stated that the Member States’ economic 
policies and other Community policies should also contribute in a coordinated fashion 
(Article 130b). The key task of the ERDF was also restated, namely, “to redress the main 
regional imbalances in the Community through participation in the development and 
structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind and in the 
conversion of declining industrial regions” (Article 130c).  
As to the operational method, the underlying approach was clearly spelled out. Speaking 
in front of the European Parliament, Delors indicated that:36  
“In the case of structural measures, there were respectable arguments for either of 
two concepts of what the Community should be doing. The first of these, a purely 
macroeconomic concept, relies on the virtues of the invisible hand operating 
through financial flows; as long as they are on a large enough scale, transfers of 
resources between Member States should bring about economic convergence. The 
second, both microeconomic and structural, looks to speed up the spread of 
innovation, eliminate bottlenecks and encourage efforts to derive the benefits of 
scale. In other words, it is a matter of keeping structural policies ‘close to the 
ground’. Encouraged by the success of the integrated Mediterranean programmes, 
the Commission came down in favour of the latter, a less extravagant and more 
effective course.” 
Given these aims, and with the legal framework in place, the main budgetary elements 
and general regulatory guidelines of the new Cohesion policy were agreed under the 
Delors-I package deal of February 1988, in which the heads of government gave their 
approval to the key strategic decisions for implementing the Single European Act.37 This 
provided the Structural Funds with a major cash injection and financial stability by 
doubling their budget over the 1989-1993 period.  
The deal also set out the key regulatory elements of the reform, fleshed out in more detail 
in the package of regulations agreed in the latter half of 1988.38 Four main principles 
were established to underpin policy implementation, heralding a new era in the 
governance of Cohesion policy and which continue to constitute its cornerstones: 
                                                 
36  Address by Jacques Delors to the European Parliament on 18th February 1987, Bulletin of the 
European Communities Supplement 1/87 (OJ 18.02.1987, No 2-348, pp. 94-102). 
37  Commission of the European Communities (1987) Commission Communication, The Single Act: a 
new frontier for Europe, COM (87) 100 final, Brussels. 
38   The package of regulations were approved through Council Regulations (EEC) No. 4253/88 to 
4256/88, of 19 December 1988 (OJ L374/31, 31 December 1988). 
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• concentration, on a series of 5 priority objectives, three of which were spatially 
restricted on the basis of Community-based eligibility criteria;39 
• programming, involving a shift from project assistance to supporting multi-annual 
programmes drawn up by the Member States in line with Community objectives and 
priorities and approved by the Commission; 
• partnership, to formally require the involvement of relevant regional and local 
authorities in programme formulation and implementation; 
• additionality, reconfirming the requirement to ensure that EU expenditure is not 
substituted for national expenditure. 
The reform of Cohesion policy stimulated strong interest amongst European integration 
scholars who saw in the new governance arrangements, especially the partnership 
principle, emerging properties of broader significance for the Union as a polity.40 The 
model was famously encapsulated by the term Multi-level Governance, emphasising the 
increasingly shared and interlinked nature of decision-making between Community, 
national and subnational actors, in contrast to state-centric accounts of policy-making.  
The 1993 and 1999 reforms: fine-tuning, decentralisation and effectiveness 
While 1988 is considered the watershed of the Union’s regional policy, the two 
subsequent reforms have been more modest in scope, with the main focus on fine-tuning 
the new governing principles, particularly to improve policy effectiveness and 
decentralise responsibility to Member State authorities. The reforms must also be seen 
within the context of Treaty reform, deepening integration (through the completion of the 
internal market and progress with Economic and Monetary Union) and two enlargements 
In 1993, the first set of reforms once again took place within the context of a major 
Treaty revision. After the completion of the internal market, the Maastricht Treaty 
(approved in February 1992) marked a new age in European integration by providing for 
the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It also reinforced the 
priority attached to economic and social cohesion by making it a core EU objective, on a 
par with the internal market and EMU. In this context, a new instrument, the Cohesion 
Fund, was introduced to co-finance infrastructure projects in the poorer Member States 
(Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal) and support them in fulfilling the EMU 
convergence criteria. In addition, the Maastricht Treaty required the Commission to 
publish a Cohesion Report every three years, to examine progress made towards 
                                                 
39  Objective 1 (lagging regions) eligibility was based on regions having an average GDP per head less 
than 75 percent of the Community average; Objective 2 (industrial areas in decline) had three main 
eligibility criteria – unemployment rates, percentage of industrial employment and employment 
decline relative to Community averages; and Objective 5b (rural areas) eligibility used the designation 
criteria of levels of socio-economic development, agricultural employment and agricultural income.  
40  Marks G., (1992), Structural Policy in the European Community, in Sbragia A., (ed.) Europolitics. 
Institutions and policymaking in the new European Community, Brookings Institute, Washington DC: 
Marks G., (1993), Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC, in Cafruny A.W., and 
Rosenthal G.G., (eds.), The State of the European Community, Lynne Rienner, Boulder. Marks G., 
Hooghe L., and Blank K., (1996), European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric V. Multilevel 
Governance, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, No.3, pp. 343-378; Hooghe L., (ed.) 
Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multilevel Governance, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
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achieving economic and social cohesion and presenting reform proposals (if deemed 
necessary).  
The increased priority attached to cohesion in the Treaty was reflected in a substantial 
financial boost. Agreement on the Delors II package at the Edinburgh European Council 
in December 1992 led to a doubling of the resources allocated to Cohesion policy over 
the 1994-199 period.41 Agreement on the regulatory package followed some six months 
later.42 As noted, the main principles were retained in place, but with several 
modifications.43  
First, regarding the policy architecture, the objectives were restructured. Following the 
accession of Sweden and Finland in 1995, a new Objective 6 was introduced to reflect 
the problems of sparse population. A new Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance 
(FIFG) was also created to assist in the restructuring of the fisheries sector. Second, 
spatial coverage increased from 42 percent of the Community population to 52 percent 
(most of the increase was due to the inclusion of the new German Lander), and a greater 
role was given to the Member States in the Objective 2 and 5b area selection process. 
Third, the programming process was streamlined by introducing the possibility of 
adopting a Single Programming Document (instead of a CSF and OP involving two 
decisions). Fourth, the scope of the partnership principle was broadened by specifying a 
role for economic and social partners in the regulation, within the framework of domestic 
practice.  
The next reform took place in 1999 to cover the 2000-2006 programming period. Again, 
the changes need to be set in context. On one hand, the reforms were developed and 
agreed during enlargement negotiations, although exactly when and how many of the 
new Member States were to join was uncertain at the time. The economic climate was 
also harsh, with an increasing preoccupation with unemployment, as reflected in the 
addition of a new title on employment in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, and strong 
fiscal consolidation pressures across the EU, partly associated with the introduction of 
the Euro. These difficult economic conditions largely explain why, different from 
previous reforms, the share of funding allocated to Cohesion policy for the 2000-2006 
period remained stable. The agreement was reached during the Berlin European Council 
of March 1999, allocating €213 billion to Cohesion policy, €39.6 billion of which was 
accounted for by post accession assistance. 
The regulations were subsequently approved by the Council between May and July 
1999.44 In line with the Commission’s Agenda 2000 communication, four main aims 
underpinned the reforms. The first was to increase the concentration of support. This led 
                                                 
41  Commission of the European Communities (2000) From the Single Act to Maastricht and beyond: the 
means to match our ambitions, COM (92) 2000 final, Brussels. 
42  The package of six regulations were approved through Council Regulation (EEC) No’s 2080/93 to 
2085/93, of 20 July 1993 (OJL 193, 31 July 1993) 
43   For a more detailed review, see: See Bachtler J., and Michie R., (1993), Strengthening Economic and 
Social Cohesion? The Revision of the Structural Funds, in Regional Studies, 27(8), pp.719-25. 
44   Council Regulation (EC) No 1263/1999 of 21 June 1999; Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999 of 
17 May 1999; Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999; Regulation (EC) No 
1783/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 1999; Regulation (EC) No 
1784/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 1999 (OJ L213, 13 August 
1999). 
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to a reduction in the number of priority Objectives (from seven to three) and in the 
proportion of the Community population eligible for support under the two territorial 
Objectives 1 and 2 (from 51.3 percent to 40.7 percent of the Community population). 
Responding to Member State criticisms, there was also a reduction in the number of 
Community Initiatives from thirteen to four (INTERREG, EQUAL, LEADER AND 
URBAN) and a corresponding cut in their budgetary allocation (to 5.35 percent of total 
resources). Increased thematic concentration was also sought in the mainstream 
programmes. Commission guidelines were published to steer Member State priorities for 
Structural Funds intervention during the programming process, while, in line with the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, the European Social Fund was increasingly tied to the European 
employment strategy.  
A second aim was to decentralise implementation to Member State-level by assigning 
them the core responsibility for programme content, management, monitoring, evaluation 
and control. Specific rules defined the responsibilities of the Member States, notably 
through the requirement to designate a Managing Authority for each programme. The 
role of the Monitoring Committee was also more clearly defined and its powers were 
enhanced, while the Commission would only participate in the meetings on an advisory 
capacity. In terms of the partnership principle, the general definition remained 
unchanged, although there was a clearer commitment to the involvement of 
environmental and gender equality organisations. 
The third aim was to simplify programming and implementation, principally by making 
the required content of programmes less detailed. The focus would be on Priority axes, 
while Measure-level detail (covering groups of interventions and their corresponding 
financial allocations, performance indicators and beneficiaries) would be developed at a 
later stage in a Programme Complement after the programmes were approved. In 
addition, the simplified Single Programming Document (SPD) was to be further 
mainstreamed, restricting the CSF and OP format to larger Objective 1 programmes.  
Finally, in return for decentralisation and simplification, the regulations introduced a 
number of changes designed to reinforce the effectiveness and control of expenditure, 
subsumed within a new principle on efficiency. First, the monitoring and reporting 
requirements were made more prescriptive. Second, evaluation was reinforced by 
requiring comprehensive ex-ante evaluation, mid-term evaluation and a subsequent 
update. Third, a ‘performance reserve’ was created whereby four percent of programme 
allocations to Member States would be held back and awarded at the mid-point of the 
programme period on the basis of financial, management and effectiveness performance 
criteria. Last, financial management and control was made more rigorous through the 
introduction of the so-called n+2 rule requiring committed funding to be spent within two 
years and through stronger audit and control requirements, as well as a stricter 
enforcement by the Commission of its supervisory responsibilities during the 
programming period.45  
                                                 
45   Davies S., Gross F., and Polverari L., (2008), The Financial Management, Control and Audit of EU 
Cohesion Policy: Contrasting Views on Challenges, Idiosyncrasies and the Way Ahead, in IQ-Net 
Thematic Paper, 23(2), University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.   
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The 2007-2013 reform: the strategic turn 
The most recent reform of Cohesion policy for the 2007-2013 period must be viewed 
within the context of a mix of political, economic and financial considerations, which 
had profound implications for the shape and content of policy.46 The most important 
development was the EU’s enlargement in 2004 to incorporate 10 new Member States 
with significantly lower levels of income. The new map of increased regional disparities 
in the EU was to be further amplified by the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, 
anticipated for the beginning of 2006. One inevitable and politically sensitive 
consequence was a budgetary shift in Cohesion policy resources from the EU15 towards 
the new Member States. 
Another important contextual factor was the increasing importance being attached to the 
EUs growth and jobs agenda. The Lisbon strategy was formally launched in 2000, but the 
lacklustre performance of the EU economy and the difficulties in implementing the 
programme soon became evident. The Kok report, commissioned by the European 
Council, renounced the state of progress and prompted the re-launch of the so-called 
“growth and jobs” strategy.47 An independent report led by Andre Sapir and 
commissioned by Prodi added controversy to the debate by calling for a major refocusing 
of EU expenditure to better reflect EU priorities for growth and jobs.48 Apart from 
proposing the elimination of the CAP, it called for radical reform of Cohesion policy by 
replacing the existing system with two new funds: a Convergence Fund to support 
institution building and human and physical capital in low-income countries (essentially 
the EU12); and a Restructuring Fund to support economic restructuring across the whole 
of the EU. On a similar note, some Member States – especially the Netherlands and UK – 
made proposals to restrict Cohesion policy support to the less developed Member States. 
                                                 
46  For a detailed review of the context, debate, negotiations and final agreement on the 2006 reform see:  
Bachtler J and Wishlade F (2004), Searching for Consensus: The Debate on Reforming EU Cohesion 
Policy, in European Policy Research Papers, No 55, European Policies Research Centre, University 
of Strathclyde, Glasgow; Bachtler J and Wishlade F (2005), From Building Blocks to Negotiating 
Boxes: The Reform of EU Cohesion Policy, in European Policy Research Papers, No. 57, European 
Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. Bachtler J, Wishlade F and Mendez C 
(2007), New Budget, New Regulations, New Strategies: The 2006 Reform of EU Cohesion Policy, in 
European Policy Research Papers, No. 63, European Policies Research Centre, University of 
Strathclyde, Glasgow.  
47  Facing the challenge, the Lisbon strategy for growth and employment, Report from the High Level 
Group chaired by Wim Kok, November 2004. 
48  Sapir A. et al. (2004), op.cit. 
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After a long process of reflection and debate, the Commission submitted its reform 
proposals for EU Cohesion policy and the broader EU budget in early 2004. Two years 
of protracted negotiation culminated in the European Council agreement on the EU 
budget in December 2005 under the UK’s presidency, determining the main financial 
parameters of Cohesion policy funding and its distribution across objectives and Member 
States. Following the inter-institutional agreement in April 2006, the overall amount of 
resources available for Cohesion policy over the 2007-13 period was set at €347 billion, 
representing 35.7 percent of the EU budget. The regulatory package was approved in 
July 2006, embodying the most radical reform of the policy since 1988.49 A key aim was 
to introduce a more strategic approach for targeting EU priorities, centred on the Lisbon 
strategy and involving a new planning framework. Strategic EU objectives for Cohesion 
policy were identified in Community Strategic Guidelines (CSG), while the Member 
States set out national objectives and a strategy in line with the CSG in a National 
Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF). Together, these two documents provided the 
basis for the design of the operational programmes. A “Lisbon earmarking” instrument 
was also introduced, whereby Member States agree to focus the available resources on 
specific categories of expenditure directly related to Lisbon themes.  
Under the new architecture for EU Cohesion policy, the previous Objectives 1, 2 and 3 
were replaced by three new Objectives: Convergence, Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment and Territorial Cooperation. Most resources were targeted on the 
Convergence Objective (80 percent, including the Cohesion Fund), the majority of which 
continued to focus on less-developed regions with a GDP per head of less than 75 
percent of the EU average.  
Community Initiatives and innovative actions were discontinued, apart from Interreg 
which would be subsumed within the new Territorial Cooperation Objective. The 
previous instruments linked to rural development and fisheries (EARDF-Guidance and 
FIFG) were integrated into the CAP. Three new financial instruments were introduced 
into the Cohesion policy framework in cooperation with the European Investment Bank 
Group and other multilateral banks. Jessica and Jeremie aim to support regional 
authorities in introducing private and public funds for venture capital and urban 
regeneration purposes, while Jaspers is designed to help local administration to better 
define investment projects.   
The main change in the area designation system concerns the Regional Competitiveness 
and Employment Objective, with all regions outside the Convergence Objective now 
eligible for support and full autonomy granted to the Member States to decide which 
regions are to be included at NUTS I or II level.  
                                                 
49   Council Regulation (EC) 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006; Council Regulation (EC) No 1084/2006 of 11 
July 2006; Regulation (EC) No 1080/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 
2006; Regulation (EC) No 1081/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006; 
Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 (OJ 
L210, 31 July 2006).  
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Another aim of the reform was to further simplify and decentralise the process of 
programming and implementation. In terms of programming, the Community Support 
Framework and Programme Complements were discontinued, while the mono-fund 
(ERDF or ESF) Operational Programmes have become more focused on priorities in 
terms of programming and financial management. Also, the Cohesion Fund was 
integrated into programming, in order to avoid duplications and strengthen its 
effectiveness. In the domain of evaluation, the intention is to introduce a more results-
oriented approach with increased flexibility for the Member States.50 The main change is 
that programme mid-term evaluations have become optional. Instead, ongoing needs-
based evaluations should be undertaken to assess programme implementation and react 
to changes in the external environment. The performance reserve has also become 
optional. 
Lastly, greater obligations on Member States have been introduced in relation to audit 
and control, including the requirement to designate an Audit Authority with 
responsibility for undertaking a compliance assessment of the management and control 
system, presenting an Audit Strategy to the Commission and submitting an annual 
control report and opinion. Some simplification has also been introduced, notably the 
reduction in control obligations in programmes below €750 million, the right to partial 
closure of programmes and the application of domestic eligibility rules.  
ON THE SCALE, SCOPE AND DIRECTION OF CHANGE  
This historical review has demonstrated that Cohesion policy has undergone a radical 
transformation over time, arguably more so than in any other EU expenditure policy. The 
key dimensions of this transformation can be categorised according to a series of 
constitutional, financial, strategic and operational dimensions.  
Virtually absent in the Treaty of Rome, Cohesion policy sits today on a comfortable 
constitutional setting. Economic and Social Cohesion was first introduced into the Treaty 
in the Single European Act of 1986. It was reconfirmed as a central objective of the 
European Union, alongside EMU and the internal market, in the Maastricht Treaty 
revision of 1993. More recently, the Lisbon Treaty, which has yet to be ratified by all 
Member States, added a “territorial” dimension to economic and social cohesion, 
providing the basis for a potential enlargement of the policy’s scope to address broader 
spatial issues, although the precise implications remain contested.51  
                                                 
50  For a review, see: Polverari L., Mendez C., Gross F., and Bachtler J., (2007), Making Sense of 
European Cohesion Policy: 2007-13 Ongoing Evaluation and Monitoring Arrangements, in IQ-Net 
Thematic Paper, No.21(2), University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.  
51  Mirwaldt K., McMaster I. and Bachtler J. (2009), Reconsidering Cohesion Policy: The Contested 
Debate on Territorial Cohesion, in European Policy Research Papers, No. 66, European Policies 
Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
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The changes in the constitutional basis of policy have been matched by a progressive 
increase in its financial resources. Since the creation of the ERDF in 1975, the budget for 
cohesion has increased steadily, from a mere 5 percent to around 36 percent of the EU 
budget over the present 2007-2013 period. Although low as a percentage of total EU 
GDP, cohesion funding represents an important share of economic development 
resources in the poorer Member States and regions of the EU. For instance, it is 
estimated that Cohesion policy allocations over the 2000-2006 period represented as 
much as 60 percent of total public capital expenditure in Portugal (48 percent in Greece 
and 24 percent in Spain).52  
The modifications to Cohesion policy have been equally far reaching from a strategic and 
operational perspective. Over time there has been a progressive transformation from an, 
essentially, redistributive mechanism strongly linked to Member State preferences into a 
genuine regional development policy, based on EU-wide objectives and priorities and 
delivered through an innovative implementation system entailing cooperative 
mechanisms among supranational, national and regional administrations.  
For much of the policy’s history, there has been no overarching European strategy 
guiding its operation. Various periodic reports and guidelines were produced by the 
Commission to provide assessment and guidance to policy, but it is only in the last two 
reforms (1999 and 2006) that there has been a progressive embedding of Cohesion policy 
within the EU’s general strategy for economic and social development, namely the 
European Employment Strategy and, subsequently, the Lisbon agenda. Related to this, a 
role for the Council of Ministers has been established for the first time in the 
implementation of Cohesion policy, through the provisions for strategic reporting on the 
contribution of Cohesion policy to EU objectives during the 2007-2013 period. 
As result of this strategic shift, the competitiveness and efficiency aspects of the policy 
have assumed a heightened importance in recent years, at least in policy debates, 
discourse and documents. Yet in the minds of many, not least the Commission, the 
solidarity and redistributive rationale of policy remains a central feature, particularly in 
terms of geographical eligibility and the financial intensity of support. In this context, 
fundamental changes have also been seen, over time, in the approach to area designation 
- in many senses the defining feature of a regional policy.53 Since the 1988 reforms, the 
majority of resources have been targeted on the most disadvantaged European regions, 
determined on the basis of EU criteria and averages. Before this, all resources were 
transferred to Member States to spend on projects within their own domestically-defined 
priority areas. Outside the less developed regions, however, geographical zoning 
requirements introduced in 1988, and fine-tuned in the next two reforms, have been 
removed for the current period by devolving decisions on the spatial allocation of 
funding under the Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective to the Member 
States. 
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Turning to the policy’s implementation system, a core innovation introduced in the 
watershed reforms of 1988 was the setting up of a unique multilevel governance model, 
involving the collective participation of vertical partners (Community, national, regional 
and local authorities) and horizontal stakeholders (business representatives, trade unions, 
NGOs, etc) in the design and delivery of programmes according to a common set of 
organisational and functional criteria and rules. While organisational and functional 
systems for designing and delivering EU-funded development programmes differ greatly 
(mainly reflecting institutional and cultural differences among and within the Member 
States), the implementation requirements have nonetheless generated strong convergent 
pressures, through concepts such as multi-annual integrated planning, partnership, 
monitoring and evaluation, best practice, etc, all of which now have a common meaning 
in the vocabulary of regional policy practitioners and analysts.  
In this respect, a variety of committees, networks, guidelines and animation activities 
ensure continuous interaction among the different levels, resulting in a closely-
interlinked arena of EU and national bodies and of public, private and societal actors. 
This has contributed to the development of a polycentric, trans-national administration 
sharing similar policy beliefs, acting through bodies organised along the same lines, 
following the same procedures and speaking the same technical language. In recent 
years, moreover, the policy has “gone global” by initiating structured dialogues with 
non-EU countries (e.g. Brazil, China and Russia) and other international organisations 
(e.g. MERCOSUR). 
From this evolutionary perspective, it can be seen that the policy has become much more 
than a mere exercise in redistributing funds from rich Member States to poorer ones, 
although this is still a fair characterisation of some of the financial decisions during the 
big budgetary deals. It has, moreover, developed into a powerful regional development 
instrument in its own right with the potential to steer resources towards EU objectives 
and to improve administrative practices and culture across Europe.  
The approach has not been without its problems. A recurrent issue, illustrated clearly in 
the previous section, has been the desire to improve the effectiveness of the governance 
arrangements by seeking an optimum balance between EU conditionality, to steer the use 
of the funds towards EU objectives, and subsidiarity, to allow flexibility in the use of 
funds at the most effective level. This in turn has impacted on the evolving relationship 
between the Commission and the Member States and the substantive requirement of the 
policy.54 For instance, the 1993 reforms (for the 1994-1999 period) saw the Commission 
assume a much stronger and pro-active role in negotiating the plans and operational 
programmes, backed up by strengthened regulatory conditionalities on the use of the 
funds.55 In the next reform covering the 2000-2006 period, the responsibility for key 
elements of programme design and delivery were, to an extent, devolved to the Member 
States, while the Commission extended its influence to the monitoring, evaluation and 
                                                 
54  A more detailed overview of the key substantive changes is provided in the Annex to this paper. 
55   On this point see the critique by Bachtler J. and Mendez C. (2007) of the renationalisation thesis put 
forward by Pollack M., (1995), Regional Actors in an Intergovernmental Play: The Making and 
Implementation of EC Structural Policy, in Rhodes, C. and Mazey, S., (eds.), The state of the 
European Union, Vol.3, Longman, Harlow; and supported, amongst others, by: Allen D., (1996), 
Cohesion and Structural Adjustment, in Wallace H and Wallace W., (eds.), Policy-Making in the 
European Union, Third Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford; Bache I., (1998), The Politics of 
European Union Regional Policy: Multi-level Governance or Flexible Gatekeeping, Sheffield 
Academic Press, Sheffield. 
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control of outputs, again with stronger regulatory requirements in these fields. This trend 
has continued in the 2007-13 period, where the Commission has become less involved in 
the substantive content of policy, shifting its focus to issues of audit and control as well 
as more strategic issues, although with a mixed record of success.  
This review of the evolution of the key dimensions of Cohesion policy throws up some 
important questions. For example, how was it possible for the policy to have changed so 
radically over time? And on what basis was it able to overcome the limitations (and 
opportunities) arising from Member State preferences? 
THE KEY EXPLANATORY FACTORS OF CHANGE  
The answers to the above questions reside in a broad array of factors. These include: 
internal policy dynamics, such as policy learning or path dependence; external events and 
processes, notably, evolving economic conditions, devolution and decentralisation trends 
and, within the context of EU integration, successive enlargements and market 
unification; the role and influence of actor coalitions and interests in shaping policy and 
budgetary outcomes, primarily the Commission and the Member States, but also other 
EU institutions, sub-national governments and a range interest groups.  
A key factor underpinning successive policy reforms relates to developments in the 
broader Community system, particularly the widening and deepening of European 
integration, although often tied to redistributive bargaining over the EU budget.  
Successive EU enlargements have had a profound impact on the timing and nature of 
Cohesion policy reform. It was the entry of Ireland and the UK which prompted the 
creation of the ERDF in the first place, largely as a bargaining instrument to address the 
low returns from the EU budget to the UK, but also to set up a development tool for 
addressing the predominantly industrial development challenges faced by its regions.  
Similar dynamics were evident in subsequent enlargements. In view of concerns over the 
competitive threat to the Mediterranean regions of France, Greece and Italy, the 
accession negotiations with Portugal and Spain in the mid-1980s provided the basis for 
the adoption of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes and had a decisive impact on 
the major reform of 1988, which required a major financial upgrading to cope with the 
much greater scale and severity of regional disparities in the Union. The next accession 
of Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995 led to the creation of a new objective targeting 
regional problems particularly relevant to the latter two of those countries, namely, 
sparse population. Finally, the latest “big-bang” enlargement of 2004 had a strong impact 
on the terms of the debate of the 2006 reforms from very early on in the process. This 
related especially to questions of budgetary redistribution, but also to issues of policy 
substance (e.g. the importance placed on institution and capacity building) and process 
(e.g. financial management considerations, such as a more flexible decommitment rule). 
With regard to the deepening of integration, Cohesion policy has been closely tied to the 
EU’s two flagship economic projects - Economic and Monetary Union and the internal 
market. Indeed, the very first Council commitment to the creation of a regional 
development fund in the early 1970’s made an explicit link with EMU, although the 
latter did not really take off. When EMU was firmly back on the agenda at the Maastricht 
Inter-Governmental Conference of 1992, it was agreed to set up a Cohesion Fund as a 
compensatory policy for the poorest Member States with a view to easing the budget 
rigidities associated with complying with their EMU convergence programmes.  
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A similar relationship can be seen with the process of market integration. In particular, 
the internal market programme was presented by its chief advocate, Jacques Delors, as 
necessitating a strengthened Cohesion policy to address the potentially negative 
consequences for the poorer economies of the Union - an argument which was actively 
employed by these countries in the issue-linkage politics of the budget negotiations over 
the Structural Funds - and as a vehicle to further the legitimacy of the European project 
amongst its citizens.56 In this respect, and whether one is referring to the deepening or 
widening of integration, ideas of fairness and the pursuit of solidarity amongst EU 
Member States, regions and citizens have been consistently held up by defenders of the 
policy as a core justifying feature of its rationale from its creation through to each of the 
subsequent turning points. 
Other ideas which have had an important bearing on the development of Cohesion policy 
include evolving thinking about the role of public intervention and the changing 
paradigm of regional policy. At an abstract level, the role of Cohesion policy must be 
seen within the context of a much broader debate concerning the relationship between the 
State and the market, with Cohesion policy representing an example of so-called 
“regulated capitalism” through its role in redistributing resources, pursuing social-market 
economy priorities and shaping partnerships among public, private and societal actors.57 
For instance, it is argued that Delors’ advocacy of cohesion was part of his “state-
building strategy”58 to further a federalist and social vision for Europe and to counter-
balance the liberal market philosophy underpinning economic integration.59  
Secondly, Cohesion policy has responded to, and sometimes led, changes associated with 
the paradigm of regional policy. Initiated when the “poles of development” concept was 
in vogue, the policy has subsequently developed under other currents of economic 
thinking and socio-political change, such as bottom-up development, indigenous growth, 
the “New Economic Geography”, regionalisation, multi-level governance, the knowledge 
economy, place-based or territorial development, etc. Throughout the policy’s history, 
these various approaches, concepts and trends have had an important impact on the 
evolution and the design of the policy, in maintaining political attention to regional and 
territorial issues, in providing a platform for discussion and debate for a trans-national 
regional policy Community, and in fostering the legitimisation of Cohesion policy. 
Another key vector of change has been policy experimentation and learning from earlier 
periods. Although the 1988 reforms marked a distinctive and radical turning point, some 
of the key qualitative changes were grounded in earlier experiences, mainly driven by 
Commission efforts to add value to the Member States conservative approaches to 
regional policy and to develop a distinctive Community method. A good example is the 
creation of the ERDF non-quota section in 1979, which  provided the Commission with a 
                                                 
56  Programme of the Commission for 1989, address by Jacques Delors, President of the Commission to 
the European Parliament and his reply to the debate, Strasbourg, 16 February and 15 March 1989, p8 
57  Hooghe L., (1998), EU Cohesion Policy and Competing Models of European Capitalism, in Journal 
of Common Market Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 457-477. 
58  Ross G., (1995), Jacques Delors and European Integration, Polity press, Cambridge. 
59  Grant C., (1994), Inside the House that Jacques Built, Nicholas Brealey Publishing, London; Ross G 
(1995) op.cit.; Hooghe L., (ed.), Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multilevel 
Governance, Oxford University Press, Oxford: Hooghe L., (1998), Territorial Politics in Europe: A 
Zero-Sum Game?, in Robert Schuman Centre Working Papers, No.98/41, Robert Schuman Centre, 
European University Institute, Florence. 
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policy space to experiment with programmes (instead of projects) and ‘integrated 
operations’ combining various sources of Community financing and allowing for direct 
interaction with sub-national authorities. These initiatives, along with the Integrated 
Mediterranean Programmes agreed in 1985, were very much the building blocks of the 
implementation system which was institutionalised in 1988, and which remains in force 
today. 
Closely related to all of the above factors, an understanding of the evolution of EU 
Cohesion policy must take into account the roles of the key actors and their diverse 
interests in setting the agenda and engineering policy change. Armed with its monopoly 
power of legislative initiative, the Commission has been a central force in pushing for the 
creation of a well-resourced Community regional policy based on supranational 
objectives and priorities (largely supported by the European Parliament), in designing 
regulatory proposals for reform and in brokering agreements between Member States. An 
important element in this respect has been the pro-activity of individual Commissioners 
as well as the backing from the Presidency - the Delors period representing the most 
evident examples of this.60  
The pre-eminent position of the Member States must not be overlooked, given their role 
in negotiating policy outcomes. Ultimately, it is the Council of Ministers that decides on 
the financial allocations and regulations, sometimes involving significant changes to 
elements of the Commission’s proposals.61 However, while Member States negotiating 
priorities tend to be quite logically anchored in national considerations and interests, the 
diversity of interests regarding Cohesion policy and the unanimity-based decision-
making system has meant that those countries most interested in sustaining the core 
features of the policy model established in 1988 have been able to resist attempts at 
renationalisation in recent years.  
The pressure exerted by regional level actors has also been important, given their 
generally supportive advocacy of Cohesion policy. Although largely absent from the 
policy process initially, the regional level has, since the late 1980’s, become an 
increasingly important player in the implementation of Cohesion policy across most 
Member States. Partly as a result, regional (and local) governments and actors have 
increasingly taken more interest in interacting with their national counterparts in the 
debates over Cohesion policy reform as well as with the Commission through a range of 
lobbying and networking activities at EU level, which has contributed to the proliferation 
of regional offices in Brussels and the institutionalisation of the Committee of Regions. 
Similarly, a multitude of other interest groups (e.g. trade unions, environmental groups, 
etc.) have been mobilised into pushing their own agendas and interests into the Cohesion 
policy process, although it is unclear whether they have had any significant influence 
over the design of policy.  
                                                 
60   Brennan P., (2008), Behind Closed Doors: The EU Negotiations that Shaped Modern Ireland, 
Blackhall Publishing, Dublin. 
61   For an analysis of changes to the regulations during the negotiations over successive reforms see: 
Wozniak-Boyle J., (2006), Conditional Leadership: The European Commission and European 
Regional Policy Conditional Leadership: The European Commission and European Regional Policy, 
Lexington Books. 
26 
Annex: The core strategic and operational features of EU Cohesion policy over time 
1. The planning framework – strategic level 
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2. The planning framework – operational level 
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5. Monitoring , reporting and evaluation 
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